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Fair Trade Certiﬁcation and
Livelihoods: A Panel Data Analysis of
Coﬀee-growing Households in India
Sabina Khatri Karki, Pradyot Ranjan Jena, and Ulrike Grote
This study analyzes the participation decision and income impacts of fair-trade
coﬀee certiﬁcation on small-scale coﬀee producers in the Araku valley in India
using panel data for 183 households and endogenous-switching and quantile
regression methods. The results show that fair trade certiﬁcation has a positive
eﬀect on income; the income of certiﬁed farmers is 17 percent higher on average
than the income of uncertiﬁed coﬀee producers. Furthermore, fair trade
certiﬁcation has a “bottom of the pyramid” eﬀect in that the largest income gains
accrue to farmers in the poorer quantiles.
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Coﬀee is one of the most-traded commodities and highest-valued cash crops
worldwide. Since coﬀee is mostly produced on small-scale holdings in
developing countries, its production plays a vital role in the livelihoods of 25
million rural households in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In India alone, it
provides livelihoods for more than 150,000 growers and one million workers
and their families (United Nations (UN) 2012) and small-scale holdings
account for 70 percent of the nation’s production (Coﬀee Board of India (CBI)
2015). Coﬀee became an important export commodity for India after its
independence, and today, almost 80 percent of the coﬀee produced is
exported (CBI 2015). Globally in 2012, India was the ﬁfth-largest coﬀee
producer in the world and the third-largest in Asia (Food and Agriculture
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Organization (FAO) 2012), contributing 4 percent of the world’s total
production (UN 2012).
The majority of the small-scale coﬀee producers in India are poor, and the
worldwide coﬀee crisis in the early 2000s further impoverished them. During
the crisis (Ponte 2002), many of India’s smallholders suﬀered from hunger
and took on large amounts of debt, and a few committed suicide
(Chattopadhayay and John 2007). In response to volatile market prices, credit
constraints, and supply shocks, several alternative market channels—fair
trade, organic, Smithsonian bird-friendly, and Rainforest Alliance certiﬁcation
—have been promoted as possible solutions. These certiﬁcation schemes are
based primarily on environmental and social parameters. Fair trade
certiﬁcation, for example, is aimed at improving the living conditions of
operators of certiﬁed farms, and organic and bird-friendly certiﬁcation
schemes promote organic agriculture and preservation of bird species on
certiﬁed farms. Simultaneously, certiﬁcation schemes recognize that
proﬁtability is the major driver of adoption of such certiﬁcations by
smallholders and hence incorporate provisions for price premiums for
certiﬁed farmers.
Another factor in development of certiﬁcation schemes worldwide is demand
by consumers in developed countries for environmentally friendly and socially
responsible coﬀees (Rice 2001, Basu, Chau, and Grote 2003). Fair trade
certiﬁcation, which is one of the oldest and is the second-largest initiative
after organic certiﬁcation, is known for promoting social justice and having
high standards in terms of development that favors small-scale producers
(Raynolds, Murray, and Heller 2007). Under the fair trade regime, small-scale
coﬀee farmers in developing countries are supposed to beneﬁt from long-
term trading relationships, price premiums, social projects such as
establishing schools and healthcare centers, ﬂexible credit arrangements, and
greater labor rights (Muradian and Pelupessy 2005, Raynolds, Murray, and
Heller 2007).
Several empirical studies, conducted mostly in Latin America and Africa, have
examined factors that inﬂuence adoption of fair trade certiﬁcation and its
impacts on household welfare in terms of incomes and consumption
expenditures (Arnould, Plastina, and Ball 2009, Jena et al. 2012, Ruben and
Fort 2012, Chiputwa, Spielman, and Qaim 2015). The results have been
mixed. Jena et al. (2012) studied coﬀee-growers in Ethiopia and found that
organic and fair trade certiﬁcations there did not contribute to incomes or
reduce poverty but did have a signiﬁcant impact on per capita consumption.
Ruben and Fort (2012) also found no signiﬁcant gains in income for fair-
trade-certiﬁed Peruvian coﬀee farmers. However, Arnould, Plastina, and Ball
(2009) found small, uneven increases in household welfare in Peru,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Recently, in a study in Uganda, Chiputwa,
Spielman, and Qaim (2015) found that fair trade certiﬁcation had a
signiﬁcant positive impact on household living standards relative to organic
and UTZ certiﬁcation. All of these studies were based on cross-section data
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and used propensity score matching with either a binary or multiple treatments.
Parvathi and Waibel (2015, 2016), on the other hand, used panel data to
analyze the impacts of organic and fair trade certiﬁcation for farmers
growing black pepper in India. Applying propensity score matching and an
endogenous switching regression method, they found that participation in
fair trade did not contribute to higher incomes for organic pepper farmers
but did increase their asset levels.
Against this backdrop, we analyze farmers’ decisions to participate in fair
trade certiﬁcation and the welfare impacts of participation in terms of
income for small-scale coﬀee producers in the Araku valley of Andhra
Pradesh in India. Using panel data for two years, this study is the ﬁrst to
capture dynamic impacts of coﬀee certiﬁcation over time. We also employ an
endogenous switching regression method that addresses self-selection and
unobserved-variable bias. The regression creates a counterfactual scenario
for the treatment and control groups and compares the results of the actual
and counterfactual scenarios for each group, thus providing a credible
treatment eﬀect. Furthermore, we use quantile regression to capture possible
heterogeneous eﬀects of fair trade certiﬁcation on income. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to evaluate the impacts of coﬀee
certiﬁcation in India using two methodologies. The results show that fair
trade certiﬁcation increased incomes for certiﬁed coﬀee farmers relative to
farmers who did not obtain certiﬁcation. Moreover, the proportional increase
in income is greatest for farmers in the lower income quantiles, suggesting
that relatively poor certiﬁed farmers have beneﬁtted more than their richer
counterparts.
Data and Methodology
Survey Site
The panel data for this analysis were collected via a survey of coﬀee growers in
Araku valley of Andhra Pradesh, where coﬀee production comes almost entirely
from smallholders. The valley has an elevation of 900–1,100 meters above sea
level and annual rainfall of 1,000–1,200 millimeters. The total area under coﬀee
production is about 20,000 hectares, mostly of Arabica beans, with average
production of about 3,100 metric tons per year. The region’s production
system is unique; coﬀee there is entirely shade-grown and is intercropped
with peppers, mangos, jackfruits, and vegetables.
Coﬀee producers in the Araku valley are primarily tribal people known locally as
Adivasi who originally conducted slash-and-burn shifting cultivation of various
crops prior to cultivating shade-grown coﬀee (CBI 2015). The Indian
government promoted coﬀee-growing in the valley in 1995 through the
Integrated Tribal Development Agency (ITDA) as a way for tribal communities
to preserve local ecosystems and to provide a continuous, assured source of
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income to inhabitants of the community for basic amenities. Initially, CBI provided
technical support. In 2001, a non-governmental organization (NGO) began
working in the area and has since played a major role in providing technical
support for collectively organizing coﬀee production, facilitating international
certiﬁcation, and assisting growers with marketing and exports. Coﬀee
producers cannot be individually registered for fair trade certiﬁcation so the
NGO helped them to organize a producer cooperative in 2007. The cooperative
was fair-trade certiﬁed in 2008 and was the ﬁrst and the largest coﬀee
cooperative in India to receive such certiﬁcation (Mercereau and Vignault
2008). Hereafter, to simplify the discussion, we refer to the households simply
as certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed based on their participation in the fair trade
cooperative.
The structure of a value chain for fair trade coﬀee is composed of various
actors and activities: supplying of inputs, production, processing, and
marketing. The primary actor is the producer cooperative, which performs
multiple functions for its members, including collecting the coﬀee and
assisting with credit and some processing activities, such as drying, grading,
and sorting. The beans collected from producers are sent to a centralized unit
for further processing and are then directly exported as fair-trade certiﬁed
coﬀee. This supply chain is shorter than conventional supply chains because
of the relatively small number of parties involved.
Data Collection
The household survey used to collect the panel data was conducted in 2010 and
2011 and followed a multi-stage sampling procedure. First, we selected the
Visakhapatnam district of Andhra Pradesh state since coﬀee is grown only in
that district and then selected six subdistricts, also called mandals, where the
cooperative was working. We then selected thirteen villages from the six
subdistricts and randomly selected households from those villages in
proportion to the size of the village following a random-walk method. The
households were assigned to groups based on whether the household belonged
to the cooperative and thus produced fair-trade-certiﬁed coﬀee. The structured
questionnaire collected data on socio-economic and farm characteristics,
household incomes and expenditures, certiﬁcation status, services provided to
the household by the cooperative, and sales channels used by the grower.
The 2010 survey involved 183 households with 86 growing certiﬁed coﬀee
and 97 growing uncertiﬁed coﬀee. In 2011, we surveyed the same 183
households, now comprised of 105 certiﬁed growers and 78 uncertiﬁed
growers (Table 1).
Methodology
Our variable of interest, participation in certiﬁcation, is based on individual
selections and could be correlated with unobservable characteristics such as
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individual farmers’ degree of motivation or ability, which would also aﬀect their
incomes. A simple comparison that ignores such correlation could provide
misleading results that attribute diﬀerences in income between certiﬁed and
uncertiﬁed coﬀee-growers to certiﬁcation even if participating in the fair
trade cooperative had no eﬀect on income. To account for both endogeneity
and sample selection, we use an endogenous switching regression consisting
of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the model estimates the decision to
participate in fair trade certiﬁcation using a random utility framework. A
utility-maximizing farmer chooses to participate in certiﬁcation if the utility
derived from participation, UPi, is greater than the utility derived from
nonparticipation (UNPi). Since those utilities are unobservable, the utility gain
(UPi – UNPi), denoted by P*, can be expressed in the latent variable model as a
function of observable components and the error term:
(1)
P

i¼βXi þ ε0 with Pi ¼ 1 if P

i > 0
0 otherwise

where P is a binary variable for participation in fair trade certiﬁcation that takes
a value of 1 if the farmer chooses to participate and 0 otherwise, X is a vector of
explanatory variables, β is a vector of coeﬃcients to be estimated, and ɛ is the
error term.
The observed variables in the model are household characteristics, physical
assets, training, and ﬁnancial resources. The inﬂuence of each of these
variables on the participation decision is based on previous ﬁndings
(Holzapfel and Wollni 2014, Ayuya et al. 2015, Wollni and Zeller 2007,
Chiputwa, Spielman, and Qaim 2015, Parvathi and Waibel 2015, Khonje et al.
2015) and is summarized in appendix 1. The household characteristics
included in the model are age, education, gender, dependency ratio, and
farming experience. We expect that education and training in farming will
improve farmers’ ability to make decisions about best practices and adopting
new technologies and thus increase the probability of participation in
certiﬁcation. We also expect that experience with coﬀee cultivation will be
positively associated with participation in fair trade certiﬁcation because
Table 1. Transition to Certiﬁcation between 2010 and 2011
2011
Uncertiﬁed Certiﬁed Total
Uncertiﬁed 78 (80%) 19 (20%) 97
Certiﬁed 0 (0%) 86 (100%) 86
Total 78 (43%) 105 (57%) 183
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experience allows producers to gain knowledge over time to evaluate
certiﬁcation schemes. Land and livestock holdings serve as proxies for assets,
and we expect that farmers who have greater capital can aﬀord to take risks
associated with adopting new practices and will be more likely to participate
in fair trade certiﬁcation. Access to nonfarm income also increases their risk-
bearing capacity and is likely to have a positive eﬀect on participation.
After estimating the eﬀect of the variables on the likelihood of a farmer
choosing to participate in certiﬁcation, we analyze the relationship between
household income (expressed as purchasing power parity in U.S. dollars (PPP
$)) and the explanatory variables conditional on participation using ordinary
least squares with a selection correction term:
(2) YC ¼ XCβC þ εC
(3) YNC ¼ XNCβNC þ εNC
where YC and YNC represent income for certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed households,
respectively, and ɛC and ɛNC are the error terms.
The endogenous switching regression is estimated simultaneously using full
information maximum likelihood, and endogeneity is modeled through
correlation between the error terms (ɛC, ɛNC, and ɛ0), which is observed to
have a trivariate normal distribution with zero mean. The covariate matrix is
speciﬁed as
Cov ðεC ; εNC; ε0Þ ¼
σ2C σCNC σC0
σCNC σ2NC σNC0
σC0 σNC0 σ20
2
4
3
5
where σ2C and σ
2
NC are the variances of the error terms εC and εNC in outcome
equations 2 and 3 and σ20 is the variance of error term ɛ0 in selection
equation 1.
For better identiﬁcation of the model, an exclusion restriction is applied in
which Xi in equation 1 contains one selection instrument, training, that is not
included in equations 2 and 3 (Wooldridge 2010). To test the validity of that
instrument, we follow a simple falsiﬁcation test suggested by Di Falco,
Veronesi, and Yesuf (2011). The results of the test showed that training
aﬀected participation in fair trade certiﬁcation (Table 5) but did not aﬀect
the incomes of uncertiﬁed households (see appendix 2), conﬁrming the
validity of training as the selection instrument.
Using this framework, we compare the expected income of certiﬁed
households to their expected incomes in a counterfactual hypothetical case in
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which they are not certiﬁed. Table 2 presents the conditional expectations and
counterfactual hypothetical cases, which are derived as follows.
(4A) EðYC=A ¼ 1Þ ¼ XCβC þ σCλC
(4B) EðYNC=A ¼ 0Þ ¼ XNCβNC þ σNCλNC
(4C) E(YNC=A ¼ 1) ¼ XCβNC þ σNCλC
(4D) EðYC=A ¼ 0Þ ¼ XNCβC þ σCλNC
Cases A and B in Table 2 represent the actual expectations (incomes observed in
the sample) and cases C and D represent the counterfactual expected incomes.
The treatment eﬀect on the treated (TT) is given by the diﬀerence between A
and C.
(5) TT ¼ EðYC=A ¼ 1Þ  EðYNC=A ¼ 1Þ
¼ XCðβC  βNCÞ þ ðσC  σNCÞλC
Similarly, the treatment eﬀect on the untreated is the diﬀerence between D and B.
(6) TU ¼ EðYC=A ¼ 0Þ  EðYNC=A ¼ 0Þ
¼ XNCðβC  βNCÞ þ ðσC  σNCÞλNC
Quantile Regression
We expect that certiﬁcation will aﬀect low-income and high-income households
diﬀerently. Therefore, to capture the heterogeneity eﬀect and comprehensively
investigate the relationship between certiﬁcation and income, we perform a
quantile regression, which is a robust method for asymmetric distributions that
allows estimation of the eﬀects of predictor variables across quantiles of a
dependent variable:
(7) QyiðτjXi; αiÞ ¼ αiþX 0i βðτÞ
where Qyi(τjXi, αi) denotes the τth conditional quantiles of Yi given Xi in the
interval (0,1). The estimates are obtained by minimizing
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(8)
X
i
QτðYi  XiβðτÞÞ:
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical
model and Table 4 presents the diﬀerence in each explanatory variable for
certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed households.
Results and Discussion
Adoption of Fair Trade Certiﬁcation
Table 5 presents the results of the pooled probit model analyzing the
determinants of participation in fair trade certiﬁcation. The Wald chi-square
test statistic (22.09) indicates that the explanatory variables are jointly
statistically signiﬁcant (p< 0.1). Farmers who receive training in farming are
more likely to participate in fair trade certiﬁcation than farmers who do not,
a result that underlines the importance of training in promoting fair trade
participation found by Wollni and Zeller (2007). Contrary to Parvathi and
Waibel (2015), we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of the livestock variable is
statistically signiﬁcant and positive, indicating that asset ownership has a
positive and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on fair trade participation, perhaps because
livestock provides for diversiﬁcation of the risk associated with adopting fair
trade by providing cash or allowing coﬀee-growers to secure credit.
The probability of participation in fair trade certiﬁcation increased signiﬁcantly
between 2010 and 2011, as indicated by the signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient of
the year dummy variable. The amount of land, years of farming experience, access
to nonfarm income, age and level of education of the household head, the
household’s dependency ratio, and the regional location variables do not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect participation in fair trade certiﬁcation.
Table 2. Conditional Expectations and Treatment
Sub-sample
Decision Stage
Treatment
EﬀectsTo Be Certiﬁed Not to Be Certiﬁed
Households that are certiﬁed A: E(YC / A¼ 1) C: E(YNC / A¼ 1) TT
Households that are not certiﬁed D: E(YC / A¼ 0) B: E(YNC / A¼ 0) TU
Note: A and B represent the observed expected log of monthly per capita income. C and D represent the
counterfactual expected log of monthly per capita income. A¼ 1 if households are certiﬁed and 0 if
households are not certiﬁed. YC is the log of the monthly per capita income if households are certiﬁed,
YNC is the log of the monthly per capita income if households are not certiﬁed, TT is the eﬀect of the
treatment (certiﬁcation) on the treated (households that are certiﬁed), and TU is the eﬀect of the
treatment (certiﬁcation) on the untreated (households not certiﬁed).
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Table 3. Deﬁnitions and Summary Statistics of the Variables over Time
2010 2011
Variable Deﬁnition Mean
Std.
Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev.
Independent Variable
Certiﬁed Dummy variable that equals 1 if the farmer is participating in fair
trade certiﬁcation and 0 otherwise
0.46 0.50 0.57 0.49
Nonfarm income Dummy variable that equals 1 if the farmer has access to nonfarm
income and 0 otherwise
0.84 0.36 0.95 0.21
Experience Years in coﬀee farming 9.84 9.35 10.70 7.83
Age Age of household head in years 39.55 10.03 40.58 9.96
Total land Farmers’ total land in hectares 1.87 1.03 2.05 1.31
Education Education of household head in years 2.46 4.53 2.46 4.53
Gender Dummy variable that equals 1 if the household head is a male and 0
otherwise
0.90 0.29 0.90 0.29
Livestock The number of livestock kept in tropical livestock units 3.09 4.75 2.14 2.03
Dependency ratio Household members younger than 14 and older than 65 divided by
household members 15–65
0.38 0.50 0.41 0.48
Training Dummy variable that equals 1 if the household received training in
farming and 0 otherwise
0.39 0.48 0.45 0.49
Dependent Variable
Monthly per capita income
(PPP$)
Monthly income of the household divided by the total household size 28.87 41.80 30.57 37.23
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Table 4. Diﬀerence between the Explanatory Variables for Certiﬁed and Uncertiﬁed Households
2010 2011
Certiﬁed Uncertiﬁed Certiﬁed Uncertiﬁed
Independent Variable
Access to nonfarm income 0.86 (0.03) 0.83 (0.03) 0.95 (0.02) 0.94 (0.02)
Experience 9.34 (1.08) 10.27 (0.88) 10.58 (0.85) 10.87 (0.71)
Age 40.25 (1.04) 38.92 (1.04) 41.53 (0.93) 39.30 (1.17)
Total land 1.90 (0.12) 1.84 (0.09) 2.14 (0.13) 1.93 (0.13)
Education 1.53 (0.37) 3.28*** (0.52) 2.19 (0.40) 3.29* (0.51)
Livestock 4.50 (2.31) 1.84 (1.84) 2.49 (0.21) 1.68*** (0.19)
Dependency ratio 0.32 (0.04) 0.44* (0.05) 0.40 (0.04) 0.42 (0.05)
Training 0.50 (0.05) 0.29*** (0.04) 0.54 (0.04) 0.34*** (0.05)
Gender 0.90 (0.03) 0.89 (0.03) 0.90 (0.02) 0.89 (0.03)
Dependent Variable
Monthly per capita income (PPP$) 28.29 (2.89) 29.38 (5.25) 32.50 (3.91) 27.97 (3.73)
N 86 97 105 78
Note: The test of diﬀerence uses the t-test. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, and statistical signiﬁcance is denoted by *** at the 1 percent level and * at
the 10 percent level.
K
arki,Jena
and
G
rote
Fair
T
rade
Certiﬁ
cation
and
Livelihoods
4
4
5
C
ore term
s of use, available at https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s. https://doi.org/10.1017/age.2016.3
D
ow
nloaded from
 https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core. Technische Inform
ationsbibliothek, on 11 Jul 2017 at 09:30:27, subject to the C
am
bridge
Impacts of Certiﬁcation on Income
The sampled households derived income from farm and nonfarm activities.
Farm income consisted of sales of coﬀee and other crops (paddy, black
pepper, and vegetables). Table 6 reports incomes for certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed
farmers in 2010 and 2011 by type—crop, coﬀee, and nonfarm—expressed in
purchasing power parity.
In 2010, much of the income of certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed farmers came from
nonfarm activities as 84 percent of the sampled farmers reported access to
nonfarm earnings (Table 3). Certiﬁed farmers had signiﬁcantly higher coﬀee
incomes and produced and sold more coﬀee than uncertiﬁed farmers in 2010
and 2011 (see Tables 6 and 7). Their greater coﬀee production relates to
larger areas of land (0.94 hectares versus 0.85 hectares for uncertiﬁed
Table 5. Results of the Probit Model for Participation in Fair Trade
Certiﬁcation
Variable Coeﬃcient
Access to nonfarm income 0.20 (0.27)
Livestock 0.09 (0.04)**
Farming experience 0.01 (0.01)
Log of total land 0.01 (0.15)
Dependency ratio 0.26 (0.16)
Age of household head 0.05 (0.06)
Age squared 0.00 (0.00)
Education of household head 0.02 (0.02)
Gender of household head 0.15 (0.28)
Year dummy (2011¼ 1) 0.33 (0.15)**
Araku region 0.40 (0.26)
Dumbriguda region 0.22 (0.26)
Ananthagiri region 0.55 (0.34)
Hukumpeta region 0.18 (0.29)
Selection instrument
Training 0.28 (0.16)*
Constant 1.66 (1.37)
Log likelihood 546.2
Wald chi-square 22.09
Prob> chi-square 0.07
Observations 362
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance is denoted by ** at the 5
percent level and * at the 10 percent level.
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farmers) allocated to coﬀee and greater productivity from the same amount of
land. Higher coﬀee productivity for certiﬁed farmers is also associated with
eﬃcient farming and the technical skills obtained from the cooperative. Their
greater incomes from coﬀee can also be explained by higher prices received
at the farm gate from private merchants (see Table 7).
Table 7 presents model estimates of yields and mean prices received by
certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed producers in 2010 and 2011 for coﬀee cherries
(unprocessed fruit consisting of the bean, parchment hull, pulp, and skin) and
dry parchment coﬀee (skin and pulp removed). There is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the mean price received by certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed farmers for
coﬀee cherries in 2010. For dry parchment coﬀee, however, uncertiﬁed
farmers, on average, received a 5 percent lower price than certiﬁed farmers.
This diﬀerence can be explained by limited bargaining power. Since
uncertiﬁed farmers have less possibilities of selling their coﬀee to the
cooperative, they must mostly sell their dry parchment coﬀee to private
merchants.
The mean prices for dry parchment coﬀee received by certiﬁed and
uncertiﬁed farmers diﬀered signiﬁcantly in 2011 and were higher than the
2010 prices by about 6 percent for certiﬁed farmers and 3 percent for
uncertiﬁed farmers. The price of red coﬀee cherries declined in 2011 by
about 4.8 percent for certiﬁed farmers and 3.8 percent for uncertiﬁed
farmers. The cooperative determines the price paid to the farmers based on
the market price for coﬀee, which ﬂuctuates, and the decline in the price in
2011 may primarily reﬂect market conditions.
In 2011, the mean total annual income for certiﬁed farmers rose (to PPP$
1,600) while annual income for uncertiﬁed farmers declined slightly (to PPP$
Table 6. Sources of Household Income
Certiﬁed Uncertiﬁed
2010
Crops 486 (964) 509 (1,287)
Coﬀee 574 (566) 413** (414)
Nonfarm activities 668 (933) 665 (773)
Annual total household income 1,471 (1,310) 1,311 (1,440)
2011
Crops 512 (809) 391 (669)
Coﬀee 756 (1,203) 498* (803)
Nonfarm activities 492 (360) 490 (389)
Annual total household income 1,600 (1,497) 1,229* (1,172)
Note: The test of diﬀerence uses the t-test. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance is denoted by ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level.
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1,229). Coﬀee was the major source of income for certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed
farmers, increasing in 2010 by 32 percent and 20 percent, respectively (see
Table 6). The increases clearly derived from greater quantities of coﬀee sold
and higher prices received from private merchants. Certiﬁed farmers again
had signiﬁcantly higher coﬀee incomes than uncertiﬁed farmers but also
earned slightly more from crops while uncertiﬁed farmers earned less from
crops in 2011.
The results show that nonfarm income decreased by about 26 percent for
certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed farmers in 2011 despite an 11 percent increase in
households’ access to nonfarm income over time (Table 3). This result
explains why farmers were highly motivated to grow coﬀee and relatively
unmotivated to take on oﬀ-farm employment.
To examine the dynamic eﬀects of fair trade certiﬁcation further, we
performed a descriptive analysis of the nineteen households that became
certiﬁed during the study period (between 2010 and 2011). We assumed
that these households had randomly selected to be certiﬁed based on
unobservable characteristics but could not extend the econometric analysis
due to the small sample size. Table 8 presents socio-economic characteristics
calculated for those households for 2010 and 2011. We ﬁnd that the mean
income from coﬀee more than doubled after certiﬁcation due to greater
production and a higher mean price for coﬀee sold. Production increased by
almost threefold in 2011 due to productivity more than doubling and greater
allocations of land to coﬀee production, which signal the households’ interest
in coﬀee production. Greater use of inputs, training, and better management
practices also contributed to higher coﬀee production. Furthermore, prices
received for dry parchment coﬀee rose about 18 percent while income from
crops and nonfarm activities decreased.
Table 7. Coﬀee Sold and Prices Received by Certiﬁed and Uncertiﬁed
Farmers
Certiﬁed Uncertiﬁed
2010
Mean red cherry coﬀee price 20.34 (0.59) 20.27 (0.47)
Mean dry parchment coﬀee price 106 (11) 101* (10)
Coﬀee yield (kilograms per hectare) 628 (672) 485 (520)
2011
Mean red cherry coﬀee price 19.36 (1.46) 19.5 (0.89)
Mean dry parchment coﬀee price 112 (29) 104** (22)
Coﬀee yield (kilograms per hectare) 640 (565) 525 (925)
Note: The test of diﬀerence uses the t-test. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. The statistical
signiﬁcance is denoted by ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table 9 presents the results of the endogenous switching regression model.
The ﬁrst column presents the income function for certiﬁed households and
the second column presents the function for uncertiﬁed households. The
results of the likelihood ratio test for joint dependence of the selection and
outcome equations are not signiﬁcant and thus validate use of the switching
probit model as opposed to the bivariate probit model. The diﬀerence in the
coeﬃcients from the income equations for certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed
households illustrates the presence of heterogeneity in the sample. The
negative signs on ρ1 and ρ0 indicate that households that were less likely to
participate in fair trade certiﬁcation were more likely to have relatively low
incomes due to unobservable household characteristics.
Years of farming had a positive eﬀect on the household income of uncertiﬁed
farmers. The number of livestock kept also positively inﬂuenced household
Table 8. Socio-economic Characteristics of the Nineteen Households that
Transitioned to Certiﬁed Production during the Study Period
Variable 2010 Uncertiﬁed 2011 Certiﬁed
Land (hectares)
Total land 1.77 (1.06) 1.82 (0.94)
Coﬀee land 0.89 (0.45) 0.93 (0.41)
Agricultural land 0.92 (0.93) 0.98 (0.89)
Coﬀee Production and Productivity
Total coﬀee produced (kilograms) 275 (260) 720 (609)***
Coﬀee yield (kilograms per hectare) 334 (408) 808 (532)**
Price of coﬀee (Indian rupees)
Mean red cherry coﬀee price 20.17 (0) 18.93 (1.03)**
Mean dry parchment coﬀee price 101 (10.85) 119.00 (30.48)
Income (PPP$)
Total 1,130 (1,300) 2,004 (2,405)*
Coﬀee 333 (286) 1,395 (2,506)***
Crops 612 (1,298) 271 (473)
Nonfarm activities 571 (699) 421 (236)
Per capita 228 (226) 535 (825)**
Input Use and Management (percent)
Training 0.26 (0.45) 0.57 (0.50)***
Input use 0.36 (0.49) 0.78 (0.41)***
Management practices 0.52 (0.51) 0.68 (0.47)
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance is denoted by *** at the 1
percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent. The test of diﬀerence uses the
Wilcoxon sign rank test and McNemar’s test.
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income for uncertiﬁed farmers. For certiﬁed farmers, female-headed
households had higher incomes than male-headed households. The three
regional location variables were negatively correlated with income for
certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed farmers.
Table 10 summarizes the results of simulated impacts of fair trade
certiﬁcation on income using the predicted mean incomes from the
endogenous switching regression. The values for A and B along the diagonal
represent the expected mean values for the log of monthly per capita income
from the actual conditions: 3.07 and 2.72 for certiﬁed and uncertiﬁed
farmers respectively. Comparing those results would be misleading; one
might conclude that, on average, certiﬁed households earned about 11
percent more income than uncertiﬁed households. The ﬁnal column presents
the treatment eﬀect of certiﬁcation on income. A positive mean diﬀerence of
C from A indicates that the certiﬁed households gained from being certiﬁed;
statistically, their mean household income was 17 percent higher than it
would have been if they had not been certiﬁed (the counterfactual). A similar
conclusion is drawn from the positive mean diﬀerence of B from D;
Table 9. Second-stage Determinants of Income
Variable Certiﬁed Uncertiﬁed
Nonfarm income 0.188 (0.230) 0.216 (0.286)
Farming experience 0.002 (0.008) 0.036** (0.015)
Age of household head 0.006 (0.051) 0.009 (0.065)
Age squared 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Dependency ratio 0.119 (0.155) 0.110 (0.214)
Log of total land 0.063 (0.113) 0.267 (0.165)
Education of household head 0.003 (0.019) 0.013 (0.024)
Gender of household head 0.412** (0.223) 0.304 (0.321)
Livestock 0.002 (0.039) 0.127* (0.073)
Year dummy 0.097 (0.152) 0.160 (0.222)
Araku region 0.555** (0.232) 0.651** (0.287)
Dumbriguda region 0.580*** (0.218) 0.716** (0.306)
Ananthagiri region 0.819*** (0.296) 0.052 (0.492)
Hukumpeta region 0.712*** (0.223) 1.002*** (0.029)
Constant 4.015*** (1.439) 3.495** (1.387)
ρ1 0.206 (0.619)
ρ0 0.229 (0.749)
Likelihood ratio test for independent equations (ρ1¼ ρ0): chi(1)2 ¼ 2.07 Prob> chi2¼ 0.149
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The statistical signiﬁcance is denoted by *** at the 1
percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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uncertiﬁed households would have earned higher incomes if they had been
certiﬁed. The net impact of certiﬁcation when the two results are combined
is a positive income eﬀect.
The results of the quantile regression are presented in Table 11. Participation
in fair-trade certiﬁcation has a statistically signiﬁcant impact on income for the
25th, 50th, and 75th quantiles; the coeﬃcients indicate that income increased
by 32 percent in the 25th quantile, 27 percent in the 50th quantile, and 25
percent in the 75th quantile. These results demonstrate that participation in
fair trade certiﬁcation has the largest positive impact on the lower income
quantile. Thus, fair trade certiﬁcation beneﬁts relatively poor farmers more
than relatively rich farmers.
Other Beneﬁts from Certiﬁcation
We found that many of the certiﬁed coﬀee-growers did not understand fair
trade certiﬁcation. When asked what certiﬁcation meant to them, only 15 of
the 86 certiﬁed participants in 2010 (17 percent) reported knowing about
certiﬁcation. In 2011, the number was somewhat higher but still quite low:
32 of the 105 households producing certiﬁed coﬀee (30 percent). This
limited understanding may be related to a lack of education since the average
number of years of schooling of farmers was 2.5, and the cooperative also
might not have explained certiﬁcation or disseminated information about it
to the farmers.
We further asked coﬀee-growers to rank three major advantages of
certiﬁcation. Bonuses received, lack of marketing problems, and higher prices
were reported most often. Of the 86 households in 2010, 19 reported
bonuses, 9 reported no marketing problems, and 2 reported higher prices.
Considerable progress had occurred by 2011, when 100 of the 105
participants reported bonuses and no marketing problems and 85 reported
higher prices. When the cooperative makes a proﬁt, the coﬀee-growers
receive bonus payments that are based on the quantity of coﬀee they sold. An
interview of a key informant and informal discussions with the growers
Table 10. Mean Treatment Eﬀect from Fair Trade Certiﬁcation
Decision Stage
To Certiﬁed Not to Certiﬁed
Average
Treatment Eﬀect
Certiﬁed households A: 3.07 (0.02) C: 2.54 (0.04) 0.52***
Uncertiﬁed households D: 3.29 (0.03) B: 2.72 (0.05) 0.57***
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level is denoted
by ***.
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Table 11. Results of the Quantile Regression
Dependent Variable: Log(Monthly per Capita Income)
Variable 5th Quartile 25th Quartile 50th Quartile 75th Quartile 95th Quartile
Certiﬁed 0.282 0.321** 0.277* 0.253* 0.165
(0.332) (0.144) (0.154) (0.151) (0.216)
Nonfarm income 0.222 0.060 0.311 0.311 0.520
(0.247) (0.276) (0.265) (0.236) (0.334)
Farming experience 0.017 0.021** 0.010 0.014 0.022
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019)
Age of household head 0.074 0.092 0.028 0.010 0.079
(0.086) (0.066) (0.048) (0.057) (0.076)
Age squared 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dependency ratio 0.072 0.136 0.060 0.162 0.296
(0.216) (0.163) (0.136) (0.194) (0.275)
Log of total land 0.387*** 0.158 0.151 0.235 0.150
(0.216) (0.194) (0.162) (0.151) (0.193)
Education of household head 0.001 0.030 0.009 0.008 0.040*
(0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.026) (0.024)
Gender of household head 0.495 0.606** 0.295 0.198 0.787
(0.347) (0.283) (0.250) (0.296) (0.650)
Livestock 0.014 0.027 0.029 0.036 0.187***
(0.064) (0.050) (0.034) (0.054) (0.061)
Year dummy 0.534 0.299* 0.056 0.046 0.229
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(0.218) (0.160) (0.118) (0.134) (0.197)
Araku region 1.036*** 0.735*** 0.620*** 0.456 0.390
(0.341) (0.248) (0.212) (0.292) (0.414)
Dumbriguda region 0.871*** 0.534** 0.481** 0.398 0.792***
(0.380) (0.252) (0.197) (0.306) (0.229)
Ananthagiri region 1.146*** 0.767** 0.612** 0.141 0.352
(0.503) (0.296) (0.245) (0.363) (0.325)
Hukumpeta region 1.206** 0.743*** 0.788*** 0.380* 1.145***
(0.570) (0.250) (0.291) (0.218) (0.227)
Constant 4.167*** 5.043*** 3.857*** 3.381** 3.380*
(2.114) (1.626) (1.238) (1.372) (2.022)
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The statistical signiﬁcance is denoted by *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level.
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suggested that the 2011 bonus amounted to four Indian rupees per kilogram of
coﬀee.
One of the purported beneﬁts of fair trade certiﬁcation is a social premium for
the community, such as support for the local school. The survey therefore asked
the coﬀee-growers to report any such beneﬁts to the community or their
households from participation in certiﬁcation. Some social beneﬁts were
reported by 19 households (23 percent) in 2010 and 39 households (37
percent) in 2011. Households acknowledged three types of community beneﬁts
in 2010 and 2011 (provision of school uniforms, life insurance, and vermi
compost tanks) and a fourth (pumping machines) in 2011 (see Table 12). In
both years, the trend of receiving a social beneﬁt remained the same; 48
percent of the households received school uniforms (provided to girls), and
receiving school uniforms ranked ﬁrst in both years, followed by life insurance,
which was received by 32 percent of households in 2010 and 28 percent of
households in 2011. In 2010, 20 percent of the farmers beneﬁtted from vermi
compost tanks; that ﬁgure dropped to 18 percent in 2011. In 2011, 6 percent
of the certiﬁed farmers reported receiving pumping machines.
Summary and Conclusion
By analyzing the impact of fair trade certiﬁcation on small-scale coﬀee producers
in India, this study contributes to ﬁlling a gap in the literature on the welfare
impacts of coﬀee certiﬁcation. The study uses a balanced panel data set
collected by surveys in 2010 and 2011 of 183 households. In 2010, 86 of those
households (47 percent) produced fair-trade certiﬁed coﬀee. In 2011, 19 of the
previously uncertiﬁed households had moved to certiﬁed production.
The descriptive statistics show that, on average, certiﬁed farmers sold a larger
quantity of coﬀee and received a signiﬁcantly higher mean price than
uncertiﬁed farmers for dry parchment coﬀee in 2010 and 2011. Similarly, the
certiﬁed farmers had a signiﬁcantly greater average income from coﬀee and
greater total income (PPP$ 182) than uncertiﬁed farmers. Households that
became certiﬁed between the 2010 and 2011 surveys increased both
production and productivity and received higher prices for their coﬀee.
Table 12. Percent of Certiﬁed Farmers Reporting a Social Beneﬁt from
Certiﬁcation
Type of Beneﬁt 2010 2011
School uniform 48 48
Life insurance 32 28
Vermi compost tank 20 18
Pumping machine — 6
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Our analysis of determinants of adoption of certiﬁcation shows that
ownership of livestock and opportunities for training were the most
inﬂuential. The results from the endogenous switching regression that
accounted for endogeneity and selection bias revealed that certiﬁcation is
signiﬁcant in increasing households’ monthly per capita income. There was a
gain of 17 percent in income from opting to be certiﬁed compared to a
counterfactual scenario in which certiﬁcation did not occur. The results of the
quantile regression provide additional evidence that certiﬁcation has had a
positive impact on the incomes of coﬀee farmers in the 25th, 50th, and 75th
quantiles of the income distribution.
We further explored farmers’ knowledge of fair trade certiﬁcation and its
potential beneﬁts. Few of the participating farmers understood what
certiﬁcation meant—just 17 percent in 2010 and a somewhat larger 30
percent in 2011—but did report social beneﬁts conferred by the program.
The results of our study establish that fair trade certiﬁcation of coﬀee in India
has played a positive role in improving the incomes of participating farmers. The
beneﬁts emanate mostly from providing coﬀee-growers with access to the
certiﬁcation program’s marketing channel. The cooperative can negotiate a
higher price than the farmers can obtain individually, and the fair trade
network, by collecting the villagers’ coﬀee, eliminates the cost of long-distance
transportation for individual growers. Another key beneﬁt is the cooperative’s
provision of credit at the beginning of the planting season. This is a crucial
support. Numerous studies of coﬀee growers have demonstrated that lack of
access to credit prohibits many of the farmers from making investments
needed to improve their productivity (Jena et al. 2012). Communities also
beneﬁt from fair trade certiﬁcation because the programs often provide social
premiums such as support for schools and for farmers in general.
The positive synergy that fair trade certiﬁcation has created in the study
region points to the value of further strengthening this initiative through
collaborative eﬀorts by the cooperative and the local government. However, a
caveat applies when generalizing fair trade’s potential to improve livelihoods.
The positive gains identiﬁed in this study may be associated with limited
diversity of resources and assets among these tribal farmers. The cooperative
would thus be able to generate gains in income by guiding the farmers into
an organized market network. Sustaining those gains over the long term is a
daunting task given the limited education of the farmers. Therefore, the
cooperative likely will have to move from an external welfare program to an
inclusive, structured farmers’ association that can periodically address
speciﬁc problems confronting the farmers and provide timely solutions.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Factors inﬂuencing adoption/participation in certiﬁcation
Variables
Inﬂuence on certiﬁcation
decision Source
Age ve Holzapfel and Wollni 2014
Ayuya et al. 2015
Education þve Wollni and Zeller 2007
Holzapfel and Wollni 2014
Farming experience þve Chiputwa, Spielman, and Qaim
2015
Wollni and Zeller 2007
Parvathi and Waibel 2015
Land þve Parvathi and Waibel 2015
Wollni and Zeller 2007
Livestock þve Khonje et al. 2015
Access to non-farm
income
þve Parvathi and Waibel 2015
Training þve Wollni and Zeller 2007
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Appendix 2: Test on validity of selection instrument
For households that are not fair trade certiﬁed
Variable Log income per capita
Access to non-farm income 0.249
(0.284)
Farming experience 0.039**
(0.015)
Age of household head 0.005
(0.068)
Age squared 0.000
(0.001)
Dependency ratio 0.149
(0.185)
Log of total land 0.260
(0.179)
Education of household head 0.017
(0.023)
Gender of household head 0.264
(0.327)
Livestock 0.141**
(0.063)
Year dummy 0.206
(0.180)
Araku 0.684**
(0.288)
Dumbriguda 0.668**
(0.300)
Ananthagiri 0.041***
(0.432)
Hukumpeta 0.995***
(0.343)
Selection instrument
Training 0.013
(0.194)
Constant 3.446**
(1.474)
Wald test on selection instrument (F-sat) 2.64
R2 0.29
Adjusted R2 0.18
Number of observation 175
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) levels.
Source: Own calculations.
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